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Introduction
Just over ten years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 1 decided that Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.)2 had become dated and needed *596 a
complete revision to meet the demands of modern commerce.3 This
determination had potentially momentous consequences. Article 2 is a

*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. The author
thanks Dean Michael Young and the law school for the ir generous re search supp ort.
Pro fessor P eter B . Maggs gave m e many helpful suggestions.
1
NCCU SL is a non-profit organization organized in 1892 for the purpose of
drafting model state laws and persuading state legislatures to enact them . Its
mem bersh ip includes over 300 lawyers, judges, and law professors. It has had great
success in its many endeavors. See Nat’l Conference of Comm ’rs on Unif. State
Laws, About Us, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp (last updated June 18,
200 2).
2
U.C .C. art. 2 (2002).
3
See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised
Article 2, 54 SMU L. Rev. 787 , 789 & n.1 2 (2001 ) (describing the decision to
revise A rticle 2 and the appointment of a d rafting co mmittee).
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model law, drafted in the 1950s and enacted in forty-nine states and various
territories and possessions.4 Because Article 2 governs almost all contracts
for the sale of goods, 5 its revision could affect the legal rules applicable to
consumer and non-consumer transactions worth trillions of dollars each
year.6
Since the time of NCCUSL’s decision to modernize Article 2, two
successive drafting committees have worked ardently on the revision
project.7 Their labors have produced more than a dozen detailed drafts. 8
The initial drafts sought to update nearly all aspects of Article 2.9 This
approach, however, proved too controversial. NCCUSL was worried that
some state legislatures might refuse to enact the contemplated changes
because of potential opposition from consumer or business groups.10
NCCUSL did not want to destroy the present uniformity of Article 2 by
advancing amendments that some jurisdictions might reject. 11
Accordingly, several years ago, NCCUSL began scaling back its plans
for revision.12 At long last, on August 5, 2002, it announced its final
approval of a rather modest set of amendments to Article 2.13 *597 The

4

See Unif. Commercial Code, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been
Adopted, 1B U.L.A. 1 (S upp . 200 2).
5
See U .C.C. § 2-102 (defining the scope of Article 2 ).
6
Statistics on retail and merchant wholesale sales are available from the U.S.
Census Bureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updated
No v. 11, 200 2).
7
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 79 0-91 .
8
For th e full text of the se dra fts, see Nat’l Conference of C omm ’rs on U nif.
State Laws, Dra fts of Uniform and M odel Acts, at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulc_fram e.htm (last updated S ept. 14, 20 02).
9
The 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, for example, sought to rewrite large portions
of Article 2. Se e id.
10
See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The
Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1683, 1684 (19 99).
11
See id .
12
See Bureau of N at’l Affairs, NCC USL A ccepts Compro mise on Scope but
Rejects Bid To Finalize Art. 2 Changes, 70 U.S.L.W. 2099, 2099-100 (Aug. 21,
2001) (describing how the drafting committee has scaled back its ambition for
revising Article 2 ) [hereinafter N CCUS L Accepts Compromise ].
13
For the press release announcing NCCU SL’s decision, see Nat’l Conference
of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Revision to Key Articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code C omp leted, at http:// www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/
pr08 0502_U CC.asp (Aug. 5, 2002). For the actual text of the approved amendments, see Proposed Amendments to Unifo rm Comm ercial C ode Article 2--Sales
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proposed revisions facilitate electronic commercial transactions and make
minor corrections and adjustments but otherwise avoid significant
substantive changes.14
The approved amendments will not become law until they overcome
two hurdles. First, the American Law Institute (ALI)15 , with whom
NCCUSL traditionally has collaborated when drafting and revising the
U.C.C., must approve the changes. This approval is highly likely but not
certain because NCCUSL and the ALI have disagreed about Article 2 in the
past.16
Second, and more significantly, state legislatures must enact the
amendments. NCCUSL has an impressive record of persuading states to
pass its model laws, but it may have some difficulty persuading legislators
of the need to make the proposed revisions, scaled back as they are. Even
if all goes well, the process will take years to complete.
The decision not to revise Article 2 from top to bottom as originally
planned raises an important question: how significant is NCCUSL’s failure
to achieve what it set out to accomplish when it decided to undertake a
complete modernization of Article 2 in 1991? In other words, will the
commercial law suffer a great deal, or is the scaling back of the project not
so very important?
Assessing the need to revise Article 2 is very difficult, if not impossible.
Commentators and participants in the revision process have had widely

(2002), at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/annual2002.htm (last visited
No v. 6, 20 02) [hereinafter Annual Meeting 2 002 Draft].
14
Commentators gene rally agreed that more amb itious changes had little
likelihood of passing. See Fred H. Miller & W illiam H. H enning, The State of the
Uniform Commercial C ode--2001, SG0 43 ALI-AB A 1, 8-9 (2001 ) (discussing
Article 2’s uncertain future, and concluding, “While a number of fixes in amended
Article 2 would be nice, an amendment effort that goes too far to cover minor
matters or takes too regulatory a stance will fail”).
15
The AL I is a private organization of lawyers, judges, and law professors.
Founded in 1923, the ALI has devoted its energy to improving the law by
publishing restatements of the law and working with NCCUSL on mo del laws. See
American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, at http:// www.ali.org
(last visited Sept. 23, 2002 ).
16
In 2001, the ALI app roved a set of revisions, but N CCUS L withhe ld its
app roval. See N CCUS L Accepts Compromise , supra note 1 2, at 20 99-1 00.
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different opinions.17 This Article, accordingly, does not *598 argue either
for or against revision. Instead, it has a more limited goal. It strives to
demonstrate only that events of the past decade have made changing the
law increasingly less important. In other words, it seeks to show that,
however urgent the need to modernize Article 2 was in 1990, this need
ironically has waned with the passage of time. Article 2 requires less
change now than it did a decade ago to meet the requirements of modern
commerce.
This Article supports this claim by looking at three very significant
developments that have occurred since 1990. The first is the emergence of
“electronic commerce”--the buying and selling of goods in transactions
formed using computers.18 The widespread introduction of a new way of
creating contracts for the sale of goods, at first blush, might seem to
increase the need for revising Article 2. Yet, as explained more fully below,
19
the recent growth of electronic commerce actually tends to diminish the
importance of Article 2’s present contract formation rules because it

17

The decade-long work of the ALI and NCCUSL ’s drafting committees
demonstrate the continuing support of these organizations for the idea of revising
Article 2, although they have not always agreed on every detail. Prominent industry
opposition came from General E lectric an d the Software Publishers Association.
See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet
Security, 10 High Tech. L.J. 213, 274 n.301 (1995). Professor James J. White led
much of the academic opposition to Article 2. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising
UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607, 617 n.32 (2001)
(asserting that Professor White “opposed much of Revised Article 2 in print, on the
floor of the ALI and NCC USL, and in strategy sessions with strong sellers outside
of the process”). For examples of criticism, see Patricia A. Tauchert, A Survey of
Part 5 of Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. Re v. 971, 972 (20 01) (noting that the
strongest conc erns include the app lication o f Article 2 to softwa re, the relationship
to the Uniform Electronic T ransactions A ct, federal legislatio n on electronic
contracting, and wa rranty rights); James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised
Article 2, 75 W ash. U. L.Q. 315, 322-26 (1997) (criticizing proposed revision
requ iring sellers to d isclose all terms a nd obtain info rmed consent on form
contracts); and James J. W hite, Comments at 1997 AAL S Annual M eeting:
Consumer Pro tection and the Uniform Commercial C ode , 75 W ash. U. L.Q. 219
(1997) (arguing against consumer protection provisions).
18
For general information on electronic commerce, see David B aumer & J.C.
Poindexter, Cyberlaw and E-Commerce (2002); Susan Singleton, Ecommerce: A
Practical Guide to the Law (2001); Barry B. Sookman, Computer, Internet and
Electronic Comm erce Law (1991 & Supp . 2000); and Benjamin Wright & Jane K.
W inn, The Law of E lectronic Co mmerce (3d ed. 20 00).
19
See infra Pa rt II.
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removes many sales transactions from the coverage of those rules.
Moreover, although electronic commerce raises new legal issues, the states
and federal government already have enacted separate legislation to deal
with them. 20
The second development relates to an important decision that NCCUSL
made regarding the scope of Article 2. In particular, when NCCUSL began
the revision process, it wanted to make Article 2 govern all aspects of
contracts for the sale of computer software.21 During the past ten years,
however, NCCUSL has changed its mind. It *599 now has chosen to deal
with the sale of computer information through a separate body of law, the
Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA).22 Although
UCITA has obtained only minimal legislative approval and remains highly
controversial,23 the decision to treat the subject of computer software sales
outside of Article 2 lessens the importance of revising Article 2 for reasons
explained below.
The third development is that a decade of precedent has accumulated
since NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 in 1991. The numerous new
cases have significance because NCCUSL wanted to revise Article 2 in
large part to resolve unsettled issues that had arisen under its current text.24
The numerous decisions interpreting Article 2 during the past decade have
gone a long way in settling many of these questions. Article 2, accordingly,
has become more certain and less in need of revision with the passage of
time.
The remainder of this Article consists of five parts. Part I describes
Article 2 and the lengthy attempt to revise it. Parts II, III, and IV then
address the three developments that have lessened the need for rewriting
Article 2. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Article 2 and the Revision Process
A. Creation of the Original Article 2
The common law governed contracts for the sale of goods for most of
this nation’s history.25 In 1906, however, this tradition began to end. In that
20

See infra Pa rt II.
See infra text accom panying notes 156-57 .
22
See U nif. Com puter Info. T ransactions A ct, 7 U .L.A. 1 1 (Su pp. 2 002 ).
23
See infra Pa rt III.
24
See infra Pa rt III.
25
See 1 W illiam D . Ha wkland et al., Uniform C omm ercial Cod e Series §
1-10 2:3 (1 998 ) (describing com mon law history).
21
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year, NCCUSL promulgated the “Uniform Sales Act,”26 a model state law
seeking to codify important sales rules.27 Drafted by Professor Samuel
Williston, the Uniform Sales Act quickly received widespread approval.28
Eventually, the legislatures of more than two-thirds of the states enacted
it.29
In the 1940s, inspired by the success of the Uniform Sales Act and other
uniform state laws, NCCUSL and the ALI decided to create *600 what
eventually became the U.C.C.30 The U.C.C. is a massive model law that
governs a variety of commercial topics, including sales. As part of the
U.C.C. drafting project, NCCUSL and the ALI chose to replace the
Uniform Sales Act with what is now Article 2. NCCUSL and the ALI
published the first official draft of U.C.C. Article 2 in 1951.31 The last set
of major amendments to Article 2 took place in 1958.32
Article 2 has breathtaking scope. The article governs transactions in
“goods,”33 which it defines to include all things which are movable plus
several other types of things.34 It covers contracts made by both merchants
and non-merchants, although it contains some special rules applicable only
to merchants.35 Every year, Article 2 governs innumerable sales, ranging
from small transactions at vending machines and grocery stores to sales of
extraordinarily expensive equipment like aircraft and supercomputers.
B. The Ongoing Effort To Revise Article 2
Academic writers began questioning whether the ALI and NCCUSL
should modernize Article 2 in the mid-1980s.36 In 1986, their scholarship
came to the attention of Professor Geoffrey Hazard, who was serving as the
chair of the Uniform Commercial Code’s Permanent Editorial Board

26

See U nif. Sales A ct, 1 U .L.A. 1 (1950).
See 1 Hawkland et al., sup ra note 25, § 1-103:3 n.1.
28
See id .
29
See id .
30
See James J. W hite & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1,
at 3 (3d ed. 198 8) (describing U.C.C. history).
31
See id . at 4.
32
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 78 8.
33
See U .C.C. § 2-102 (200 2).
34
Id. §§ 2-10 5, 10 7.
35
See id. § 2-104(1) (defining the term merchant); id. § 2-104 cm t. 2 (discussing
the fourteen mercha nt rules in A rticle 2).
36
See, e.g., Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?,
31 V ill. L. Rev. 399 (1986).
27
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(PEB)37 and the Director of the ALI.38 In these capacities, Professor
Hazard asked Professors Charles Mooney and Richard Speidel to prepare
a memorandum on whether Article 2 of the U.C.C. required revision.39
*601 Professors Speidel and Mooney completed this memorandum in
1987, expressing the view that Article 2 needed various changes.40 In
response to their memorandum, the PEB appointed a Study Group to
consider the matter further, and named Professor Speidel to chair this Study
Group.41 In the fall of 1990, the PEB Study Group prepared a “preliminary
report” on the subject.42 Then, in the spring of 1991, the Study Group
completed a more focused report, which it called an “executive
summary.”43 These documents, discussed more fully below, expressed the
view that Article 2 needed revision.
In the fall of 1991, based on the recommendation of the PEB Study
Group, NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to prepare a proposed
revision.44 It selected Professor Speidel to serve as the Chief Reporter. 45
Later, it appointed Professor Linda Rusch to serve as the Associate
Reporter.46 The Article 2 drafting committee produced its first draft of the
revised article in 1994 and then produced subsequent drafts every year
through 1999.47
The committee’s July 1995 draft marked a turning point in the revision
project. In that draft, the committee made an important choice when
deciding how to address contracts for computer software. In particular, the

37

The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. is a committee with twelve
memb ers. It monitors the U.C.C., seeking to discourage non-uniform am endments
or interpretations and to detect needs for modernization. See Peter Winship, Law
Making and A rticle 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 673, 677
n.17 (1990) (desc ribing the com position of the PE B and its functions in 1986 ).
38
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 78 8-89 .
39
See id .
40
See id . at 789 .
41
See id .
42
See ABA Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report
of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 981,
986 -98 (1 991 ).
43
See PE B S tudy G roup , Unifo rm Comm ercial C ode , Article 2 Executive
Summary, 4 6 B us. Law . 186 9 (1991 ).
44
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 78 9.
45
See id .
46
See R usch, supra note 10, at 16 83 n.*.
47
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 78 9-90 .
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drafters proposed to turn Article 2 into a general “hub” that would contain
provisions important for both the sale of goods and the licensing of
software, and then to create an Article 2B as a “spoke” that would contain
special provisions for computer software.48
The “hub and spoke” experiment lasted only about a year. In 1996, the
committee produced a revised draft that abandoned the approach.49 It made
this decision because NCCUSL chose to handle licensing of computer
information in a separate uniform law that *602 eventually became known
as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).50
In May 1999, the ALI approved a proposed final draft.51 At the ALI
meeting, the Executive Director and President of NCCUSL supported the
proposal.52 NCCUSL, however, later decided not to vote on the draft
because it feared that the draft would not win support of all the state
legislatures.53 At this point, Professors Speidel and Rusch resigned from
the drafting committee in protest.54
NCCUSL then appointed a new drafting committee. The current
reporter is Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel. 55 This new committee worked
on the project with diligence and obtained NCCUSL’s final approval for a
draft in August 2002. As noted above, this draft greatly has scaled back the
drafting goals.56 Instead of completely revising Article 2, the committee
has sought only to amend a few provisions.57 It has decided to add

48

Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Comm ercial
Code Article 2B: Dec. 12, 1996 Draft, at 7, available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ucc2/uc cart1.htm (last visited D ec. 2, 2 002 ).
49
See id .
50
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 79 0 n.13.
51
See R evised U.C .C. Sales Provisions Co nsidered, Electronic Commcerce
Issues Still Troubling, 68 U.S.L.W. 2714, 2714 (M ay 30, 2000) (describing the
final draft history).
52
See S peidel, supra note 17, at 611 & n.1 5.
53
See id . at 611 & n.1 7.
54
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 79 0.
55
See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, NCCUSL Committees/Me mbers, at http://www.nccusl.org (last updated June 18, 2002). Professor
Gabriel served as a member of the original drafting committee. See Speidel, supra
note 1 7, at 61 2 n.18.
56
See A nnual Meeting 2 002 Draft, supra note 13.
57
See id .
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provisions on electronic commerce and rewrite a few troublesome
provisions, while leaving most of the article intact.58
As of the time of this writing, the future of even these less ambitious
changes remains in doubt. The ALI must approve them, and no one knows
for sure how state legislatures will react. It is likely, however, that they
will become law in the next few years.
C. The Difficulties of Revision
Professor Speidel has offered a convincing explanation for why the
NCCUSL and ALI have taken so long in approving a final revision of
Article 2.59 He does not lay the blame at the feet of any one person or
organization. Instead, he identifies five factors that each have made
changing the current law difficult.
*603 First, Professor Speidel points out that, from the outset, no
important group of commercial buyers or sellers was demanding a revision
of Article 2.60 Most businesses felt content with the status quo and viewed
every proposed change with skepticism. 61 The drafters thus faced an uphill
battle from the start.
Second, Professor Speidel believes the effort to draft a “hub and spoke”
version of Article 2 had lingering negative effects even after its abandonment.62 When the drafters attempted to turn Article 2 into the “hub,” they
renumbered and rewrote many of its provisions.63 The 1999 draft continued
to reflect many of these changes, giving Article 2 an unfamiliar visage that
troubled opponents of the revision.64
Third, Professor Speidel observes that removing the subject of computer
information licenses from the scope of the revision did not eliminate
controversy about them.65 Although NCCUSL decided to deal with
licenses in UCITA, questions about the interaction between UCITA and
Article 2 remain.66 Any proposed revision of Article 2 must address these
changes.

58

See
See
60
See
61
See
62
See
63
See
64
See
65
See
66
See
59

id .
S peidel, supra note 3, at 79 1-93 .
id . at 791 .
id .
id . at 791 -92.
id .
id . at 792 .
id .
id .
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Fourth, Professor Speidel notes that the Article 2 drafting committee ran
into great difficulty in addressing consumer protection issues.67 In his
view, the committee never could provide sufficient measures to satisfy the
desires of consumer groups.68 Yet, at the same time, commercial interests
found excessive even the limited consumer protection provisions under
consideration.69
Fifth, Professor Speidel explains that the entire process became very
political.70 Commercial interests persuaded NCCUSL that they would
lobby state legislatures against adopting the revision if they did not get
what they wanted.71 NCCUSL took these warnings seriously because it did
not want to propose legislation that would not enjoy *604 universal
adoption.72 The ALI, however, felt more reluctant to change its views
based on commercial interests.73
Professor Speidel’s analysis is persuasive. In fact, to bolster his
position, he might have compared the Article 2 revision process to the
recent drafting efforts that produced Article 4A on funds transfers and
revised Article 5 on letters of credit. The ALI and NCCUSL had little
difficulty approving these revisions, and they sailed through the state
legislatures. 74
The committees working on Articles 4A and 5 did not face any of the
factors that Professor Speidel believes impeded the revision of Article 2.
Commercial interests strongly favored the creation of Article 4A because

67

See id .
See id .
69
See id. On the merits, Professor Speidel strongly disputes the claim that the
drafting comm ittee exalted the rights of consumers over the rights of sellers. See
Spe idel, sup ra note 17, at 614 -16.
70
See S peidel, supra note 3, at 79 2.
71
See id .
72
See id .
73
See id .
74
See N at’l Conference of C omm ’rs on U nif. State Laws, Introductions &
A d o p t i o n s o f U ni fo r m A ct s: U C C A r t ic l e 4 A , a t h t t p : / /
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniform act_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca4a .asp (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002) (showing widespread adoption of these recently revised
articles); Nat’l Con ference of Comm ’rs on Unif. State Laws, Introductions &
Adop tions of Uniform Acts: UCC Article 5, at http :// www.nccusl.org/nccu sl/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca5.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (same).
68
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no legislation comprehensively addressed funds transfers,75 and they
favored revising Article 5 because it did not reflect the realities of modern
letter of credit usage.76 Consumer groups, moreover, did not oppose these
articles because funds transfers and letters of credit have little impact on
consumers. In addition, neither Article 4A nor Article 5 suffered from the
difficulties similar to those that arose from the aborted “hub and spoke”
draft revision of Article 2.
In any event, the effort to revise Article 2 has not yet achieved success.
As noted above, the final draft approved in August 2002 did not include
very many significant changes. The question therefore remains whether the
need to revise Article 2 has increased or decreased during the past ten
years. If the need has grown, then the failure of the revision process to
accomplish more of NCCUSL’s original goals is more serious than if the
need has diminished.
*605 II. The Emergence of Electronic Commerce
Article 2 contains a number of rules regarding the formation of contracts
for the sale of goods.77 Accordingly, in deciding whether the need to revise
Article 2 has increased or decreased during the past decade, one important
question is whether the methods of forming contracts to buy and sell goods
have changed. The answer to this question is decidedly yes. In fact, of all
the changes that have occurred in sales of goods in the past ten years, the
methods of forming sales contracts have seen the most innovation.
Although people still mostly use traditional methods to buy and sell
goods, a significant amount of electronic commerce has emerged. The term
“electronic commerce” refers to contracts made by means of computers or

75

See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1994) (explaining that Article 4A was
needed beca use there was “no comprehensive bo dy of law that defines the rights
and obliga tions that arise from wire transfers”).
76
See id. art. 5 prefatory note (explaining how “the customs and practices for
letter of credit” have changed in the past fifty years, requiring a revision of Article
5).
77
See id. §§ 2-201 to -210 (20 02) (stating rules concerning the “Form,
Formation and Readjustm ent of C ontract”).
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other electronic devices.78 It typically includes transactions conducted over
the Internet, either at vendors’ websites or through email.
At first blush, the growth of electronic commerce might seem to
necessitate substantial changes to Article 2. After all, Article 2 came into
being in the 1950s before anyone contemplated electronic transactions.
Article 2, therefore, unsurprisingly contains no provisions specifically
designed to deal with them.
The reality, however, differs for two reasons. First, because the
provisions in Article 2 concerning the formation of contracts have little to
say about electronic commerce, the growth of electronic commerce has
made them less important. Second, to the extent that electronic commerce
raises new legal issues, legislation outside of the U.C.C. already has
addressed most of them. The following discussion elaborates these points.
A. How Parts of Article 2 Are Becoming Less Relevant
To observe how electronic commerce is making parts of Article 2 less
relevant, consider the following example. Suppose that a law school is
running short on supplies. It wants to purchase a hundred boxes of pens,
markers, and chalk. It knows an office supply company that might have
these items. Consider how the law school would go about purchasing the
items.
*606 In 1960, 1970, or 1980, if a buyer like the law school wanted to
purchase a bulk order of goods, it might call a seller on the telephone. The
seller might provide a price quote, a description of the goods, and a
statement of the terms on which the seller wished to sell them. The buyer
then would fill out one of the buyer’s purchase order forms and mail it to
the seller. The seller would send back an acknowledgment and, at the same
time or a little while later, would ship the goods.
This routine once pervaded the economy. You can imagine the law
school and the office supply company taking these actions, not just once,
but hundreds of times over the past decades. Similarly, many thousands of
other businesses and institutions were buying and selling goods in this
manner every day.

78

The term “electronic commerce” (o r sometimes “e-com merc e”) refers to
“transactions conducted over the Internet, either by consumers purchasing goods
and services, or directly betwee n businesses.” M icrosoft Encarta W orld En glish
Dictionary, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/Dictionary/DictionaryHome.asp (last visited D ec. 2, 2 002 ).
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In 1990, the transaction probably would follow the same pattern, with
one possible change resulting from a technological advance that became
ubiquitous in the 1980s. In particular, the law school probably would fax
its purchase order to the office supply company rather than mail it. The
office supply company might then return a confirmation by fax, as well.
Very little else would change. The terms of the forms exchanged probably
would remain the same.
When the ALI and NCCUSL were drafting the U.C.C. in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, they recognized that this simple but seemingly timeless
type of transaction occurred thousands of times a day. They also realized
that it could be important to determine whether parties had created a
contract and, if they did, what the terms of the contract might be.
Accordingly, they included in part 2 of Article 2 a number of very detailed
rules to address issues that might arise when contracts for the sale of goods
are formed in this manner. 79
Section 2-206(1)(b), for instance, makes clear that a buyer’s purchase
order will be construed as an offer to buy goods, unless it says otherwise.
80
This rule saves parties (and later the courts) the *607 trouble of
scrutinizing the possibly ambiguous or pithy language of a purchase order
to determine whether it constitutes an offer or merely preliminary

79

See U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to -210 (stating rules concerning the “Form, Formation
and Readjustm ent of C ontract”).
80
See id . § 2-206(1)(b ). The U.C.C. states,
Unless otherwise unam biguously indicated by the language or circumstances... an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt
prom ise to ship o r by the p rompt or current shipment of conforming or
non-conforming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does
not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that
the shipment is offered only as an accomm oda tion to the buyer.
Id.; see also Harper Tru cks, Inc. v. Allied W elding Supply, Inc., 2 U.C .C. R ep.
Serv. 2d (C BC ) 835 (D . Kan . 198 6).

WANING IMPO RTAN CE O F REVISIONS TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 2

14

negotiations.81 The seller knows that it can accept the purchase order and
form a contract.
Section 2-206(1)(b) not only specifies that purchase orders are offers,
but also indicates two ways that the seller may accept them. One way the
seller can accept is simply to ship the goods.82 Indeed, as an example of
their foresight, the drafters of the U.C.C. even thought to say in section
2-206(1)(b) that a shipment of non-conforming goods would constitute an
acceptance.83 That way, if the goods turned out to be defective, the seller
could not escape liability by claiming not to have accepted the contract.84
Another way to accept is for the seller to promise to ship the goods,
such as by sending or faxing back a confirmation.85 If the seller chooses
this method, however, another issue may arise. If the buyer drafted its
purchase form, and the seller drafted its confirmation, the two may contain
discrepancies in their terms. A question may arise whether the differences
in the forms prevent formation of a contract.
Under the common law mirror-image rule, a purported acceptance that
differs from the offer in any way constitutes an implied rejection*608 and

81

See 1 W illiam D . Haw kland et al., Uniform Co mmerc ial Code Series §
2-206:2 (2002). The common law o f contracts generally requires courts to
determine whether the offeror “manifest[ed]... a willingness to enter into a bargain,
so made as to justify another person in unde rstanding that his assent to that bargain
is invited and will conclude it.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981).
Outside of the law of sales, this process often is ambiguous. See, e.g., Owen v.
Tunison, 158 A. 926 (Me. 1932) (holding that the defendant’s letter was a general
invitation to negotiate and no t an offer to sell property).
82
See U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b ).
83
See id .
84
Pro fessor H awkland explains,
Under the pre-Code law, if the offeror, usually the buyer, specified shipment
of goods as the mode of acceptance, he would have no remedy if nonconforming goods were shipped by the offeree (seller), because the offeree
could argue either (a) that the goods shipped did co nform to the contract and
therefore did not breach it, or (b) that the goods did not conform to the
contract, and therefore their shipme nt did not constitute an acceptance,
because acceptan ce of an offer to enter into a unilateral contract is
accomplished only if the offeree does the act requested by the offeror (here,
by shipment of conforming goods).
1 H awkland et al., supra note 81, § 2 -206 :3.
85
See U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b ).
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a counter-offer.86 This rule ensures that parties are not bound to terms to
which they do not assent. But the mirror-image rule also has drawbacks. If
the parties do not pay careful attention to the forms, they may think that
they have a contract, only to discover later that minor differences have
prevented the contract’s formation.87 Either party then can back out of the
transaction without liability for breach, despite potential harm to the other
party. 88
The drafters of the U.C.C. sought to address this problem by creating
exceptions to the mirror-image rule. Under section 2-207(1),89 a contract
may be formed even if the purported acceptance contains additional or
different terms, unless the acceptance specifically requires the offeror to
assent to these terms. 90 If the parties formed a contract despite differences
between the offer and acceptance, section 2-207(2) specifies the legal effect
of any additional terms contained in a purported acceptance.91
86

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (“A reply to an offer which
purp orts to accept it but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms additional to
or different from those o ffered is not an accep tance but is a co unter-offer.”).
87
No te, Offeree’s Respo nse M aterially Altering an Offer S olely to O fferor’s
Disadvantage Is an Acceptance Cond itional on Offeror’s Assent to the Additional
Terms Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 111 U . Pa. L. Rev.
132 , 133 (1962).
88
See id .
89
See U .C.C. § 2-207(1). T he U .C.C. states,
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
add itional or different terms.
Id. T he U .C.C. further states,
Conduct by bo th parties which recognizes the existence of a co ntract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms o n which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
provisions o f this Act.
Id. § 2 -207 (3).
90
See id . § 2-207(1).
91
See id . § 2-207(2).
T he additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Betwee n mercha nts such terms become p art of the contract unless:
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*609 Even if the exception in section 2-207(1) does not apply,
formation may occur under the first sentence of section 2-207(3) as a result
of conduct recognizing the existence of a contract.92 For example, the
seller could ship the goods and the buyer could accept and pay for them,
notwithstanding a statement in the acceptance requiring the offeror to
accept additional terms.93 In this case, the second sentence of section
2-207(3) would specify that the terms of a contract include any terms upon
which the two forms agree.94
A contract formed, either by the forms exchanged or by conduct, might
raise another issue that the drafters of the U.C.C. carefully addressed. In
particular, the contract might leave unstated important issues like the time
of delivery or the price of the goods. This possibility is especially likely if
the contract was formed by conduct under section 2-703(3) where the forms
did not agree. The absence of clear terms on these topics could present a
problem at common law because the contract might not be sufficiently
definite to enforce.95
Yet again, the drafters of the U.C.C. had the foresight to address this
difficulty. Section 2-204(3) adopts a more permissive standard than the
common law traditionally did with respect to indefiniteness.96 The section
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they
materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been
given o r is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Id. For discussion of the problem of different terms, see infra notes 197-200 and
acco mpa nying text.
92
See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (“Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.”).
93
See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d
103 (7th C ir. 197 9).
94
See U.C.C. § 2-20 7(3) (“In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.”); Dresser
Indus. v. Gradall Co., 965 F .2d 1 442 (7th C ir. 199 2) (ap plying this p rovisio n).
95
See Restatement (Second) of Co ntracts § 33(1) (1981) (“Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain.”).
96
See U .C.C. § 2-204(3) (“E ven though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make
a contract and there is a reaso nably certain b asis for giving an appropriate
reme dy.”).
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says that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness so long as the evidence
shows that the parties had an agreement and a reasonably certain basis
exists for granting an appropriate remedy.97
The analysis of this kind of typical transaction under Article 2, however,
would not necessarily end at this point. On the contrary, questions about
the terms of the agreement also might arise because of the buyer and
seller’s telephone conversation prior to the shipment. The law school or
office supply store might allege that they had *610 formed an oral
agreement regarding the terms of the contract, and that for some reason the
purchase order and the confirmation do not reflect this oral agreement. The
drafters of the U.C.C. included the parol evidence rule in section 2-202 to
specify the extent to which the contract might include the unwritten terms.98
Finally, the promises to buy and sell the goods would be enforceable
only if the parties satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds in
section 2-201(1).99 This provision generally requires promises to buy or
sell goods for a price of $500 or more to be evidenced by a signed

97
98

See id .
See U .C.C. § 2-202. T hat section provides,

Terms with resp ect to which the confirm atory m emo randa of the pa rties
agree or which are otherw ise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent
additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also
as a co mple te and exclusive statem ent of the terms o f the agreement.
Id.

99

See id . § 2-201(1).

Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods
for the price of $500 or more is not enforceab le by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or b y his autho rized agent o r broker.
Id.
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writing.100 The section, however, contains several exceptions.101 For
example, the receipt of the goods or the payment could satisfy it.102
This illustration shows something significant about the importance of
the formation provisions in Article 2. From the 1960s to the 1990s, all of
the different sections discussed were needed to provide definite answers to
basic questions about whether a typical business transaction formed a
contract and what the terms of the contract might be. The existence of
Article 2’s formation provisions during these decades would seem an
absolute necessity.
But now move ahead to the present. Law schools and other businesses
still purchase goods, but there is a new way of doing it. Instead *611 of
buying supplies with a written purchase order, the law school more likely
than not would use a computer to gain access to the Internet website of its
office supply company. The two leading office supply store chains in the
United States, Staples and Office Depot, offer all of their products online
and encourage corporate customers to purchase in this manner.103
The website would provide a complete description of the goods. The
law school user simply would click on the items sought, receive an
immediate confirmation (perhaps both on the screen and by email), and the
seller would ship the goods shortly afterward. This process has become
quite common. Despite the economic downturn and the failure of many
Internet companies, aggregate Internet sales continue to grow.104 At the
busiest times of the year, total online sales may reach $220 million in a
single day.105
What do Article 2’s formation provisions say about the formation of
contracts for the sale of goods over the Internet? The reality is not very

100

See id .
See id . §§ 2 -201 (2)-(3 ) (stating excep tions to the statute o f frauds).
102
See id. § 2-201(3)(c) (“A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respe cts is enforceab le... (c) with respect
to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been
received an d acc epted (Sec. 2-60 6).”).
103
See Staples, at http://www.staples.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002); Office
Depot, at http://www.officedepo t.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002 ).
104
Statistics on retail e-commerce sales are available from the U.S. Census
Bureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updated Nov. 22,
200 2).
105
See Online Shoppers Spent $220 Million Monday in Holiday Sales Spike,
W all St. J., N ov. 28, 20 01, at J1.
101
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much at all. As described above, the formation provisions in Article 2 were
designed to handle contracts formed in the traditional manner of exchanging phone calls and written purchase orders and confirmations. For the
most part, these specialized rules have no application in the context of
electronic commerce.
Consider, for instance, each of the provisions described at length above.
Section 2-206(1)(b), on the characterization of purchase orders as offers,106
does not apply to the typical online sale. No need arises to characterize a
purchase order sent by the buyer as an offer because an Internet buyer does
not send a purchase order. Instead, the buyer indicates assent to a sale
merely by clicking on a button on the seller’s website. Likewise, because
the buyer does not send a purchase order, the Internet seller does not accept
a purchase order. Accordingly, section 2-206(1)(b)’s rules on what
constitutes a proper acceptance of the purchase order107 are similarly
irrelevant.
In a typical online transaction, no battle of conflicting forms occurs.
Again, the Internet buyer does not send a form to the seller, but instead
merely clicks a website button. Accordingly, section 2-207(1) and (3) on
the formation of contracts involving different forms have *612 no
relevance.108 Morever, because these provisions do not apply, section
2-207(2) and section 2-207(3)’s second sentence, which concern the terms
that such a contract might have, also do not apply.109
In most situations the requirement of definiteness also would not come
into question. As noted above, indefiniteness most often becomes a
problem when parties form contracts by conduct when their forms do not
agree.110 In online transactions, the parties do not exchange conf licting
forms, and therefore do not create contracts by their conduct. Little doubt
arises over the terms of their agreement because the seller’s website
typically spells them out. For this reason, section 2-204(3)’s relaxing of the
requirement of definiteness has little consequence for online sales.111

106

See
See
108
See
109
See
110
See
111
See
107

U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b ).
id .
id . §§ 2 -207 (1), (3 ).
id . §§ 2 -207 (2)-(3 ).
su pra notes 97-98 and accompa nying text.
U .C.C. § 2-204(3).
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The parol evidence rule in section 2-202 also has no application to
typical Internet transactions. The law school would not call or otherwise
communicate with the office supply company to gather information about
the sale. Instead, the law school would browse the seller’s website, learn
the details, and then just click a box indicating a desire to purchase the
goods. The parties, accordingly, would not reach any prior understandings
or agreements that the parol evidence rule might affect.
In fact, if a court had to answer the question of whether the law school
and the supplier had a contract, it would need to look at only one provision
of the U.C.C., namely, section 2-204(1).112 This section says a “contract for
sale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to show
agreement.”113 This really is not saying much; as one of the leading U.C.C.
commentators has remarked, “The rule is a fairly obvious one, because
there has never been any doubt that contracts of sale can be made in a
manner other than a writing.” 114 The terms of the contract formed over the
Internet would be those stated in the website because the buyer does not
indicate anything to the contrary.
This simple example illustrates how the development of electronic
commerce in many ways makes Article 2 less relevant. A large number of
highly specialized Article 2 provisions that have governed innumerable
sales for over four decades do not apply to sales made using the new
method. Accordingly, to the extent that electronic commerce replaces
ordinary commerce, the provisions of Article 2 are *613 becoming less
relevant. The need for revising them thus diminishes because they affect a
decreasing amount of commerce.
B. New Issues Raised by Electronic Commerce
Even if electronic commerce has made existing Article 2 rules less
important, a separate question is whether electronic commerce raises any
new legal issues that Article 2 must address. The answer to this question,
as the following discussion will show, is no. Although electronic commerce does give rise to several very important new issues, new federal and
state statutes already handle these issues satisfactorily.115
1. Statute of Frauds

112

See id . § 2-204(1).
Id.
114
1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2 -204 :1.
115
See Miller & Henning, supra note 14, at 8 (observing that these laws have
reduced the urge ncy of revising Article 2).
113
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Section 2-201(1) says that contracts for the sale of goods for a price of
$500 or more generally must be evidenced by a signed writing to be
enforceable. 116 Electronic commerce raises two important questions about
this very important Article 2 provision. First, if a buyer and seller enter a
contract by making electronic communications over the Internet, do their
electronic communications constitute a “writing” within the meaning of
section 2-201(1)? Second, even if their communication qualifies as a
writing, how can the parties sign this writing?
Article 2 at present does not answer either of these questions. Two
statutes outside the U.C.C., however, already address them: the Uniform
Electronic Transaction Act of 1999 (UETA), a model state law enacted in
forty-one states,117 and the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN).118 Both statutes create
exceptions to statutes of frauds so that they do not prevent enforcement of
electronically formed contracts.119
*614 UETA, the state legislation, eliminates obstacles to electronic
commerce that section 2-201(1) (and other statutes of frauds) might impose
by establishing the following four rules:
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record
satisfies the law.

116

See U .C.C. § 2-201(1).
The N ational Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws drafted
and published UET A. For information and state adoption statistics, see Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Electronic Transa ction A ct, at http://ww w.ncc usl.org/nccusl/un iforma ct_
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). The full text of
UETA is availab le at http:// ww w.law.up enn.ed u/bll/ulc/fnact99/199 0s/ueta99.htm
(last visited No v. 6, 20 02).
118
15 U .S.C. § § 70 00-7 013 (2000).
119
Only one reported case has addressed either UETA or ESIGN as of
Nove mber 25, 2002. See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 2 6
n.11 (2d Cir. 20 02).
117
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(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies
the law. 120
Pursuant to these principles, electronic records and signatures may take the
place of traditional paper and ink under section 2-201(1).121
ESIGN, the federal legislation, accomplishes the same result. ESIGN
says that, notwithstanding any previously existing statute of frauds, “a
signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form.”122 It thus also allows electronic commerce to take place
without hindrance from statutes of frauds.123
In light of UETA and ESIGN, Article 2 does not need to be revised to
address issues raised by the statute of frauds. Nothing illustrates this point
better than NCCUSL’s decision to replicate UETA’s provisions in the
August 2002 approved amendments to Article 2.124

120

UETA § 7 (1999), available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/
199 0s/ueta99.htm (last visited N ov. 6, 200 2).
121
UETA defines a reco rd as “information tha t is inscribed on a tangib le
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium an d is retrievable in
perceivab le form.” Id. § 2(13). It defines an electronic record as “a record created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.” Id. § 2(7).
122
15 U .S.C. § 700 1(a)(1).
123
Although ESIGN is a federal statute, it does not pre emp t UE TA . See P atricia
Bru mfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic Commerce
L
a
w
s
,
a
t
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_articles/uniformacts-article-ueta.asp (last
visited Sept. 29, 2002) (providing an in-depth analysis of the ESIGN ’s preemptive
effects). On the contrary, ESIGN specifically provides that, if a state has enacted
UETA, then UE TA rather than ES IGN will govern excep tions to state statutes of
frauds. See 15 U.S.C. § 700 2(a)(1). Although the similarity of the statutes gene rally
makes it irrelevant which law applies, a num ber o f subtle difference do exist. See
Fry, sup ra, § 2.B. (d iscussing these difference s).
124
NC CU SL expressed the intent to replica te UE TA ’s prov isions in A rticle 2
in a prefatory note that accompanied the Annual Meeting 2001 Draft. See
Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2--Sales, prefatory note (2001),
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc0612.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Annu al M eeting 2 001 Draft] (indicating that, co nsistent with UETA
and ESIGN, all references to “writing” are being changed to “record” and that the
terms “record” and “sign” will be defined to permit electronic records and
signatures). The Annual Mee ting 2002 Draft, to which NCCUSL gave its final
approval in August 2002, replicates the relevant provisions but does not contain a
prefatory note. See Annu al M eeting 2 002 Draft, supra note 13.
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*615 2. Attribution of Electronic Records
A second issue raised by electronic commerce concerns the attribution
of electronic records to the persons who made them. Recalling the
hypothetical above, suppose that someone visits an office supply company’s website and purchases office supplies in the name of the law school.
The office supply company ships the goods and then demands payment.
The law school refuses to pay, insisting that the supplier prove that the law
school (as opposed to some unknown interloper) actually placed the order.
How can the supplier attribute the order to the law school? What proof
is legally sufficient? These are new and important questions raised by
electronic commerce. Yet, NCCUSL did not need to revise Article 2 to
address them. Again, legislation outside the U.C.C. already supplies the
answers.
UETA addresses the issue of attribution with the following provision:
[a]n electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a
person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be
shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any
security procedure applied to determine the person to which the
electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.125
Although no cases have yet applied this provision, the UETA commentary confirms that an electronic record and electronic signature would be
attributable to a person if the “person types his/her name as part of an
e-mail purchase order.”126 The commentary also makes clear that the
plaintiff would have to overcome any evidence presented by the defendant
of fraud or forgery. 127 Because of this provision, Article 2 does not need
revision to address the question of attribution. 128
*616 3. Authority and Capacity of Electronic Agents
Electronic commerce also raises questions about the authority and
capacity of computers to make contracts. For example, returning again to
the hypothetical above, suppose that a law school employee visits the

125

UE TA § 9(a ), availab le at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
ueta9 9.htm (last visited No v. 6, 20 02).
126
Id. § 9 cmt. 1.
127
See id .
128
See Annual M eeting 200 2 Dra ft, supra note 13, § 2-212 (copying almost
verbatim U ET A § 9 ).
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supply company’s website and makes a purchase. A computer processes
the sale for the supply company and sends a confirmation without any
human intervention. Could the office supply company later argue that its
computer lacked either authority or capacity to bind it to a contract?
Article 2 does not need revision to answer this question. The U.C.C.
generally has left questions of agency and capacity to non-U.C.C. law. 129
Here again, state legislatures and the federal government already have
stepped in with alternative legislation. UETA and ESIGN each contain
provisions designed to remove any doubt that electronic agents may form
contracts. UETA says, “A contract may be formed by the interaction of
electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or
reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements.”130 ESIGN contains a similar provision.131
These provisions in UETA and ESIGN do not, in fact, purport to change
existing law. Instead, as the UETA commentary asserts, they merely
confirm that machines may act as agents.132 No cases have yet *617

129

See U .C.C. § 1-103 (199 4).
UE TA § 14 (1), available at http:// www.law.up enn.ed u/bll/
ulc/fnact99/1 990 s/ueta9 9.htm (last visited No v. 6, 20 02). UE TA further states,
130

(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and
an individual, acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person,
including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the
individual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has
reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction
or performance. (3) The terms of the contract are determined by the
substantive law applicable to it.
Id. §§ 14(2)-(3).
131
15 U .S.C. § 700 1(h) (200 0). T he Code provides,
A contra ct or other rec ord relating to a transaction in o r affecting interstate
or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action
of one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such electro nic
agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound .
Id.

132

See U ET A § 1 4 cm t. 1, available at http:// www.law.upe nn.edu/bll/ulc/
fnact99/19 90s/ueta99.htm (last visited No v. 6, 20 02).
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addressed these sections, but they appear to dispel most questions that
might arise. Any amendment to Article 2 would be redundant.133
In sum, the growth of electronic commerce over the past decade has not
increased the need to amend Article 2. On the contrary, it may have
decreased the need. Many of Article 2’s current provisions address
traditional methods of making contracts, and the growth of electronic
commerce makes these provisions less relevant now than they were in
1991. Accordingly, any problems they may contain have become less
significant. Although electronic commerce raises new and important
issues, Article 2 does not need to address them because other legislation
already performs that function.
III. The Decision To Treat Computer Software Separately
Almost no private sales of computer software were taking place when
NCCUSL and the ALI approved the first version of Article 2 in the
1950s.134 During the past fifty years, however, sales of computer software
have become very important. Business and consumers purchase well over
$50 billion in software annually, and the total volume continues to grow. 135
When disputes have arisen, courts sometimes have had to consider whether
to apply Article 2’s rules to software sales.136
Computer software does not fit comfortably within Article 2 for two
reasons. First, Article 2 applies to contracts for the sale of goods,137 and

133

See Annual M eeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-20 4(4) (co pying almost
verbatim U ET A § 1 4).
134
See Graeme Browning, Software Hardball, 24 Nat’l J. 2062, 2062 (1992)
(explaining how software was bundled with the first simple computers sold in the
195 0s).
135
See Elizabeth MacD onald, CPA G roup’s Plan W ould Standardize the
Accounting for Software Expenses, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1996 , at B2 (reporting
estimate that off-the-shelf software purchases, which stood at $47.9 million, will
grow to $7 9 billion in 20 00).
136
See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that Article 2 do es apply to software); Sys. Design and Mgmt. Info., Inc.
v. Kan. City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878, 882 (K an. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that software is a good and is subject to the U.C.C.); USM
Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)
(holding that contract dealing with turnkey computer system was subje ct to Article
2).
137
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002 ) (“Un less the con text othe rwise requires, this
Article applies to transaction s in goo ds....”).
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the definition of “goods” applies problematically to software. 138 Article 2
says that goods include “things which are movable.”*618139 This definition
clearly includes tangible items, like books, even if they contain copyrighted
material.140 The definition, however, generally excludes intangibles--like
legal rights or services--because they lack physical properties that would
make them movable.141
Sometimes vendors subsume computer software into a physical object
before selling it.142 For example, a business might record a program onto
a disk, and then sell the disk. Although the program itself may lack tangible
physical properties, the disk has them, and the disk therefore clearly is a
“thing which is movable.” In this situation, courts have not had difficulty
deciding to apply Article 2.143

138

Scholars have long struggled with issues raised by the application o f Article
2 to computer software. For some early and influential thoughts, see David A.
Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer
Contrac ts, 14 N. Ky. L. Rev. 277 (1987 ) (describing the vario us approaches courts
use to determine whether a transaction in the computer industry is one for goods or
services); Andrew Ro dau, Comp uter Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code Apply, 35 Emory L.J. 853 (1988) (arguing that judicial
interpretation and the tangible and intangible pro perty aspects of software show that
it is a good); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 M ich. L.
Rev. 1149 (1979) (concluding that contracts for computer program copies are
typically within the sco pe of the U.C.C.).
139
U.C.C . § 2-105 (1) (“’Goods’ mea ns all things (including sp ecially
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale....”).
140
See C ardo zo v. T rue, 342 S o. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(definition of go ods under U.C .C. includes b ook s).
141
See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-105:2 (“The exc lusion of ‘things
in action’ and the inclusion of ‘things which are movable’ suggests that Section
2-10 5 limits go ods to tangib le personal prop erty.”).
142
See, e .g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir.
199 1).
143
See id . The cou rt explained,
An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of an orchestral
rendition. The music is produced b y the artistry of musicians and in itself
is not a “good ,” but when transferred to a laser-readab le disc beco mes a
readily merchantab le com mod ity. Similarly, when a professor delivers a
lecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.
Id. at 675.
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Yet, not all sales of computer software involve the transfer of physical
objects. For example, when a person buys a program by downloading it
from the Internet, the seller does not provide anything tangible to the buyer.
Although the buyer may store the program on one of the buyer’s own disks,
no title to the disk or to any other tangible item passes from the seller to the
buyer. 144 In this situation, deciding to apply Article 2 becomes much more
difficult.145
*619 Second, even if software falls within the definition of goods, many
software sales occur in “hybrid” transactions. A hybrid transaction involves
both the sale of goods plus the undertaking of other contractual
obligations.146 For example, a contractor might agree to sell and install a
new window. The sale of the window is a sale of goods, but the promise to
perform the service of installation is not.147 Hybrid transactions long have
complicated application of Article 2 because its scope provision does not
address them. 148 Sales of computer software often are hybrids because they
typically go beyond merely conveying title to goods from the buyer to the
seller for a price.149 Instead, the seller and buyer often agree on some set
of terms and conditions for the use of the software.
The terms and conditions on the use of software can take two forms. In
some instances, these terms give the buyer rights that the buyer would not
acquire merely by purchasing the software. For example, if the terms
include a “site license,” the buyer may copy the software for use throughout

144

See U .C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining a sa le to co nsist of the “the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price”).
145
See Lorin Brennan, W hy Article 2 Cannot App ly To So ftware Tran sactions,
38 Duq. L. Rev. 459, 465 (2001) (presenting this difficulty as one reason for
concluding that Article 2 d oes not apply to so ftware).
146
See Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553, 555-56
(M inn. 19 87) (explaining hyb rid transaction in dep th).
147
See, e.g., Co akley & W illiams, Inc. v. Shatterpro of Glass Co rp., 77 8 F.2 d
196 , 198 (4th C ir. 198 5), cert. denied, 47 5 U .S. 11 21 (198 6).
148
See U .C.C. § 2-102.
149
See generally Andrew G. Rodau, The Extension of U CC’s Article 2 to
“Hybrid” Softwa re Transactions, N at’l L.J., Jun e 22, 198 7, at 23 (discussing the
confusion o ver whether comp uter software is a “g ood ” under Article 2).
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seller’s office.150 In the absence of this license, federal copyright laws
might prevent the copying. 151
In other instances, the terms included with the sale of the software may
limit the buyer’s rights.152 For example, the terms may say that the buyer
cannot use the software for commercial purposes or *620 cannot resell the
software to certain types of users.153 Sometimes these terms even attempt
to restrict what subsequent third-party purchasers of the software can do
with it. Absent these terms, nothing in the federal copyright law would
prevent the buyer from selling the software.154
The hybrid nature of computer software sales poses a couple of serious
problems for Article 2. If the terms and conditions predominate over other
aspects of the contract, then most courts would say that Article 2 should not
govern the transaction at all.155 In addition, even if Article 2 does apply to
150

See Lothar Determann & Aaro n Xa vier Fe llmeth, D on’t Judg e a Sale by Its
License: Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and
the European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 101-02 (2001) (desc ribing site
licenses).
151
See, e.g., Geoscan, Inc. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir.
2000) (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that business violated copyright by copying
software for numero us compu ters witho ut proper site license).
152
One impo rtant po int of terminology is that, for some reason, the software
industry refers to all terms regarding the use of software as “licenses,” whether they
increase or de crease the rights the buyer ord inarily would have under applicable
copyright and other laws. This usage is both novel and somewhat confusing.
Tradition ally, when a copyright holder grants a license, the copyright holder gives
the licensee additional rights. But in the sale of software, even restrictions on what
the buyer could otherwise do with the software are called licenses.
153
See, e.g., Ado be Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (recognizing that the license restricted resale o f software only to
educational users).
154
Federal copyright law contains a “first sale” doctrine. Under this do ctrine, “a
sale of a ‘lawfully made’ copy terminates a copyright holder’s authority to interfere
with subsequent sales or distribu tion of tha t particular copy.” P arfums Give nchy,
Inc. v. Drug Empo rium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the
purchaser of a copyrighted item--like a book, music CD, or computer program--can
resell the book without violating the copyright law. The extent to which the
copyright holder may restrict the resale by contract (as opposed to copyright law)
rema ins subject to d oub t.
155
Most courts will apply the U .C.C. to a hybrid transaction when the sale of
goods predominates over aspects of the transaction. See, e.g., Boneb rake v. Cox,
499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370,
137 4 n.8 (M ass. 19 80).
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the transaction, nothing in Article 2 says anything about contractual terms
regarding the use of computer software. Its application, accordingly, has
ambiguous consequences at best.
For these reasons, devising rules for computer software sales was a high
priority when NCCUSL’s initial drafting committee began work on Article
2. As explained above, the committee tentatively embarked on a complicated scheme to put this recommendation into effect; they were going to
treat the sales portion of the transaction in Article 2, and terms regarding
the use of software in an integrated Article 2B.156 Eventually, however,
NCCUSL abandoned this plan, promulgating UCITA instead of amending
the U.C.C. 157
UCITA has not resolved the question of how the law should treat terms
regarding the use of computer software. At this time, only two states-Virginia and Maryland--have adopted UCITA.158 Although *621 NCCUSL
is working on revising the Act to give it broader appeal,159 the question of
whether or how Article 2 might govern persists in the rest of the states.
Moreover, UCITA leaves unsettled important questions about the scope of
Article 2 in hybrid transactions. For example, suppose that a person buys
a DVD player that contains a computer chip loaded with software. Doubt
remains about the extent to which Article 2 and UCITA would govern the
transaction.160
Yet, even if UCITA has not solved the problem of computer software,
the decision to address computer software outside of Article 2 has reduced
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See su pra P art II.
See su pra P art II.
158
See N at’l Conference o f Comm ’rs on U nif. State Laws, Introd uctions &
Adop tions of Uniform Acts, at http:// www.nccusl.o rg/nccusl/uniformact_
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002); see also No Votes
Taken on Amend ments to UCIT A; Decisions To B e Mad e During Conference Call,
70 U.S.L.W . 233 9 (D ec. 4, 2 001 ) (summarizing som e of the reaso ns that many
consider U CIT A to b e too contro versial).
159
See R epo rt of UCIT A Standb y Committee, at http:// www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UC ITA_Dec01 _Proposal.htm (Dec. 17, 200 1).
160
Und er one rece ntly proposed co mpromise , “Article 2 would apply to goods
that included software as a p art of their ope ration, b ut would not govern the
software itself.” NCCU SL Plans To Present Draft Without Final Approval to ALI
Council in December, 70 U.S.L.W . 219 3 (O ct. 2, 20 01). The amendments to Article
2 approved in August of 2002 do not purport to change the scope of Article 2 other
than expressly excluding “information” from the definition of goods. See Annual
Meeting D raft 2002, supra note 13, § 2 -103 (k)(1).
157
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the need to revise Article 2. Put another way, a decade ago, the drafters
believed that they had to amend Article 2 to address issues raised by the
sale of computer software. That is no longer true because of the decision
to deal with these problems in a separate way. Accordingly, one of the
main reasons for revising Article 2 has disappeared.
IV. A Decade of Precedent
More than a decade has passed since NCCUSL made its decision to
revise Article 2 in 1991.161 During this time, numerous precedents
interpreting Article 2 have accumulated. These precedents have addressed
and clarified a large number of ambiguities in Article 2’s provisions.
Although they have not eliminated all conflicts among jurisdictions, they
have improved the situation a great deal. The need to revise Article 2 to
address problems in its drafting accordingly has diminished over this time.
A. Examples of Clarification
As explained above, NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 largely on the
basis of a report prepared by a PEB Study Group.162 A significant portion
of this report focused on problems with Article 2’s drafting.*622 163 The
PEB Study Group identified a number of sections that were causing
confusion in the courts. 164
Even without amendments to Article 2, judicial decisions during the
past decade have ameliorated many of the problems identified by the PEB
Study Group. A few examples illustrate this point. One of the first
recommendations in the PEB Study Group’s report concerned section
2-601,165 which states the so-called “perfect tender rule.”166 Under section
2-601, a buyer may reject tendered goods if they “fail in any respect to
conform to the contract.”167 The buyer then may assert against the seller
the full panoply of remedies made available by Article 2 for breach of
contract.168

161

See su pra P art I.B.
See su pra P art I.B.
163
See P EB Study Gro up, sup ra note 43, at 187 2-75 .
164
See id.
165
See id . at 187 2-73 .
166
U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002) (“[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept
the who le; or (c) acce pt any comm ercial unit or units and re ject the rest.”).
167
Id.
168
See id . § 2-711 (listing these remedies).
162
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Section 2-601, at first glance, may appear to state a rather extreme rule.
Its text would seem to allow a buyer to reject goods even if they deviate
from the contract in the most minor ways. The drafters of the U.C.C.,
however, did not intend to give buyers unlimited power to reject goods
because of defects. On the contrary, in section 1-203, they specified that
every contract within the scope of the entire U.C.C. contains an implied
“obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”169
Accordingly, when exercising the right to reject goods under section 2-601,
a buyer must act in good faith even though section 2-601 does not itself
expressly state a requirement of good faith.170 If a buyer is a merchant, the
requirement of good faith means that the buyer must act honestly and must
observe “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”171
These standards of fair dealing may preclude rejections based on trivial
defects.
The PEB Study Group worried that the general implied obligation of
good faith in section 1-203 might go overlooked.172 In other words, buyers
might act in bad faith, and courts might not see the problem. Accordingly,
the PEB Study Group suggested amending section 2-601 to make clear that
a buyer had to act in good faith when *623 deciding whether to reject
goods.173 Although the PEB Study Group’s report did not specify how to
make the change, an amendment simply could insert words directly into
section 2-601 saying that rejection may occur “subject to the requirement
good faith.” Although this amendment would not change the law (given
section 1-203’s present general duty of good faith), it would bring clarity
to the law.
In the past decade, potential confusion over section 2-601 has diminished because precedent has clarified that the requirement of good faith
limits the buyer’s ability to reject. Indeed, a number of courts have applied
section 2-601, and all of their opinions correctly recognize the duty of good
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Id. § 1-203 (“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
goo d faith in its perform ance or enforcement.”).
170
See 2 W illiam D . Haw kland, Unifo rm Comm ercial C ode Series § 2-6 01:3
(2002) (desc ribing good faith limitations on § 2-60 1).
171
U.C .C. § 2 -103 (1)(b ).
172
See P EB Study Gro up, sup ra note 43, at 187 7.
173
See id . at 187 3 (“At a minim um, § 2-601 should be revised to state that
rejection is limited by the d uty of good faith.”).
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faith imposed by section 1-203. 174 Accordingly, even if some misunderstanding of the issue persists, the need to amend section section 2-601 has
waned. Indeed, the drafting committee in its most recent draft apparently
did not see a continuing need to alter section 2-601 to specify a requirement
of good faith.175
A second example concerns the statute of frauds in section 2-201.176
Section 2-201, as discussed at length above, generally makes promises to
buy or sell goods for a price of $500 or more unenforceable “unless there
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made.”177 One longstanding issue under section 2-201 is whether a party
who has detrimentally relied on a promise may overcome the requirement
of writing under a theory of promissory estoppel.178 The PEB Study Group
suggested in its report that a revision of Article 2 should address the issue
of reliance under section 2-201.179
Two competing considerations complicate this issue. On one hand,
many courts have allowed parties to overcome other statutes of *624 frauds
using promissory estoppel.180 On the other hand, section 2-201 lists several
exceptions to its writing requirement, but does not say anything about
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See, e.g., Bellsouth Telesensor v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., No.
CA -90-1553-S, 1995 W L 5209 78, at *8 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 1995); Subaru Distrib .
Corp. v. Subaru of America, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 5566 (CM), 2002 WL 413808, at *8,
*37 (S.D.N.Y. M ar. 18, 2002); In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 156 B.R. 922,
926 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 845 P.2d 567, 577 (Idaho Ct. App.
1992); Y & N Furniture, Inc. v. Nwabuoku 734 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (N.Y . Civ. Ct.
2001); Do manik Sales Co., Inc. v. Paulaner-North America Corp., No. 00-0669,
200 0 W L 18 551 44, at *1 (W is. Ct. Ap p. Dec. 20 , 200 0).
175
See A nnual Meeting 2 002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-601 .
176
See U .C.C. § 2-201.
177
Id. § 2 -201 (1).
178
See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 (discussing whether
promissory or eq uitable estoppel may pro vide an exce ption).
179
See P EB Study Gro up, sup ra note 43, at 187 4.
180
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981) (“A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance
is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the prom ise.”); Gregory E . Mag gs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the Modern D evelopm ent of Contract Law, 66 Geo.
W ash. L. Rev. 508, 523-25 (199 8) (discussing acceptance of section 139 among
different jurisdictions).
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reliance.181 This omission may suggest that the drafters of Article 2
specifically rejected the promissory estoppel theory.182
At the time the Study Group made its recommendation that a revision
should address reliance,183 great uncertainty surrounded this issue. Some
courts were willing to enforce promises based on reliance, others were not,
and still other courts had not reached the issue.184 The problem, for this
reason, called for legislative attention.
During the past ten years, the rift among jurisdictions has not disappeared. Yet, uncertainty about the issue largely has diminished. Through
numerous decisions, previously undecided states have reached one
conclusion or another. 185 Although the problem of non-uniformity among
jurisdictions remains, the need to amend the statute to bring about clarity
has waned. The amendments NCCUSL approved in August 2002, perhaps
for this reason, do not address reliance.186
A third example concerns the infamous section 2-207,187 a provision
that alters the common law’s “mirror-image rule.” The mirror-image rule
says that a purported acceptance of an offer that has different or additional
terms is not an acceptance but is in reality a counter-*625 offer.188 Section
181

See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 (“Given the liberalizing force
of the rules of Section 2 -201(2 ) and (3), it is somewhat difficult to imagine
situations where additional relief should be given by w ay of esto ppe l.” (footnote
omitted)).
182
See, e.g., Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (W ash.
1981) (rejecting pro missory estop pel in a case involving section 2-201 of the
U.C .C.).
183
See su pra note 179 and ac com panying text.
184
See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (Ct.
App. 1988) (listing cases conflicting on the issue and noting that the majority
recognize reliance as an excep tion).
185
See Christopher M . Bellomy, E stoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial C ode , 100 Com. L.J. 536 (1995) (identifying different approaches).
186
See A nnual Meeting 2 002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-201 .
187
U.C.C . § 2-207(1) (2002) (“A definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or d ifferent term s.”).
188
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) (“A reply to an offer
which purp orts to accep t it but is conditiona l on the o fferor’s assent to terms
additional to or different from those offered is not an accepta nce but is a counter-offer.”).
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2-207(1) strives to create a major exception to this rule for contracts
concerning the sale of goods. The section says that a purported acceptance
is an acceptance even if it states additional or different terms, “unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.”189
Courts have had difficulty applying section 2-207 because it contains a
number of ambiguities. For example, at the time that the PEB Study Group
wrote its report, jurisdictions disagreed about what the offeree must say to
make acceptance “expressly conditional” under section 2-207(1). In the
leading case of Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,190 one court held that
the conditional nature of the acceptance must be so clearly expressed that
the offeror has notice that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the
transaction unless the additional or different terms are included in the
contract. In contrast, in the famous decision of Roto -Lith Ltd. v. F.P.
Bartlett & Co., Inc.,191 another court held that merely including a term
materially altering the offer amounts to a conditional acceptance. The PEB
Study Group believed that section 2-207(1) required revision to address this
kind of problem.192
Two important developments have occurred in the past ten years in
relation to this particular issue. First, over a dozen cases have considered
the question, and they all have accepted the Dorton view and rejected the
Roto -Lith approach.193 Many of these decisions expressly describe the
split between Roto -Lith and Dorton, indicating that the courts thought
carefully about the question.194 Second, the First Circuit has decided to
overrule its decision in Roto-Lith.195 Accordingly, *626 the need to revise
Article 2 to address this problem largely has disappeared. The amendments
189

U.C .C. § 2 -207 (1).
453 F.2d 116 1 (6th Cir. 1972 ).
191
297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 196 2).
192
See PEB Study Gro up, sup ra note 43, at 187 4 (no ting that “ap plicatio n of §
2-207 has generated confusion in the courts, excessive litigation, and continuing
criticism fro m the comm entators”).
193
See, e.g., Frank M. Booth, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 754 F. Supp. 1441,
1447 (E.D . Cal. 1991 ); Polyclad L amina tes, Inc. v. V ITS M aschinenbau GmbH,
749 F. Sup p. 34 2, 34 4 (D .N.H . 199 0); St. Charles Cable T V, Inc. v. Ea gle
Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Sup p. 82 0, 82 8 (S.D .N.Y . 198 8).
194
See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp . 2d 1332 , 1341 (D. K an.
2000); G ard ne r Z emke Co . v. D unha m B ush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 323-24 (N .M .
1993); Stanley-Bo stitch, Inc. v. Regenera tive Envtl. Equip. Co., Inc., 697 A.2d 323,
327 -28 (R .I. 199 7).
195
See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwo od S ensors, Inc., 110 F .3d 1 84 (1st Cir. 199 7).
190
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NCCUSL approved in August 2002 modify section 2-207, but would
preserve this result.196
B. Limitations of Precedent
The foregoing discussion has shown how precedent has ameliorated
some of the problems identified by the PEB Study Group when it recommended revising Article 2. Judicial decisions have addressed not just these
three problems, but many, many other issues under Article 2. Yet,
precedents do have at least three important limitations that deserve
mention.
First, precedents over the past ten years have not clarified all issues
under Article 2. For example, another battle of the forms issue is whether
different terms in a proposed offer become part of the contract created by
section 2-207(1). Article 2 provides no express answer.197 At the time
NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2, courts had expressed three different
views on the subject.198 Since then, however, only a few cases squarely
have confronted the question.199 The topic, like many others, remains
subject to doubt.200
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The draft, which moves section 2-20 7(1) to section 2-2 06(3), would eliminate
the “unless” clause. See Annual Meeting 200 2 D raft, supra note 13, § 2-206(4). The
drafters evidently believe that an acceptance that falls within the high standard
imposed by the Dorton case would not amount to a purported acceptance. See
Annual Meeting 2 001 Draft, supra note 124, § 2-206 p relim. cmt. 2. The com ment
states,
The “unless” clause that appeared at the end of the sentence that is now
subsection (3) when that sentence was a part of original Section 2-207(1)
has been omitted as unnecessary. Subsection (3) rejects the mirror image
rule, but any respo nsive record must still be fairly regarded as an “acceptance” and not as a proposal for such a different transaction that it should be
construed to be a rejection o f the offer.
Id.

197

Sectio n 2-207(2) ad dresses additiona l terms, but not different terms. S ee
U.C.C. § 2-2 07(2) (2002 ) (“The ad ditiona l terms are to be con strued as pro posals
for ad dition to the contract.”).
198
See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 , 1579-80 (10 th Cir.
198 4) (discussing three d ifferent ap proaches to this issue).
199
See, e.g., Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628,
635 (R.I. 1998) (discussing the battle of the forms approaches taken by various
courts and adopting the “knoc k-out rule” as R hod e Island ’s approach).
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Second, amending the statute would insure uniformity among the states
in a way that judicial precedents cannot reasonably be expected to do. For
instance, even if a dozen new cases address the effect of reliance on the
statute of frauds in section 2-201(1), these *627 cases might not all reach
the same conclusions on every point. The law, moreover, would remain
unsettled in jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue.
Third, although judicial precedents can clarify ambiguities, they cannot
make necessary substantive changes to the law. For example, throughout
the revision process, the two drafting committees have sought to raise the
threshold price for the statute of frauds from $500 to $5000 to reflect
inflation since the 1950s.201 Courts have not felt free to make this type of
change. The PEB Study Group wanted the drafting committee to make
numerous revisions of this kind.202 These three limitations suggest that
some need for amendment still may remain, but do not negate the observation that the need to revise Article 2 has diminished.
Conclusion
This Article has not attempted to argue that NCCUSL erred in deciding
to revise U.C.C. Article 2 in 1991. The statute plainly had a number of
problems. Skillful drafting and substantive changes clearly could have
improved the law in some places.
The Article also has not attempted to criticize the choices that the
drafting committees have made during the decade-long revision process.
The committees have come up with many good ideas. Even if some did not
make it into the draft revision approved in August 2002, the law has benef
itted from their work.
Furthermore, this Article has not claimed that Article 2 no longer needs
revision. On the contrary, as indicated in several places, numerous
problems still remain. For example, precedents have addressed only some
of the issues that concerned the drafters a decade ago. Moreover, the
treatment of computer software remains a difficult subject.
This Article, however, has sought to demonstrate that, for a variety of
reasons, the need to revise Article 2 has diminished over the past decade.
This observation should provide some comfort to both those who supported
revision and those who opposed it. Supporters of revision can take solace
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See id . § 2-201(1) (proposing the change for inflation).
See PEB Study Gro up, sup ra note 43, at 1872-75 (recom mending numerous
substantive changes).
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in knowing that their inability to achieve comprehensive modernization
ultimately may not have had serious consequences. Opponents of revision
may see this diminishing need as a further argument for their view.
*628 This demonstration that the urgency of revising Article 2 has
waned also may have implications when state legislatures decide whether
to enact the amendments that NCCUSL finally has approved. These
amendments are not very controversial. Yet, as this Article has shown, they
also are not tremendously urgent.

